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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with the architecture definition and the safety assessment of flight control systems 
for light remotely-piloted helicopters for civil applications. The methods and tools to be used for 
these activities are standardised for conventional piloted aircraft, while they are currently a matter 
of discussion in case of light remotely-piloted systems flying into unsegregated airspaces. 
Certification concerns are particularly problematic for aerial systems weighing from 20 to 150 kgf, 
since the airworthiness permission is granted by national authorities. The lack of specific 
requirements actually requires to analyse both the existing standards for military applications and 
the certification guidelines for civil systems, up to derive the adequate safety objectives. In this 
work, after a survey on applicable certification documents for the safety objectives definition, the 
most relevant functional failures of a light remotely-piloted helicopter are identified and analysed 
via Functional Hazard Assessment. Different architectures are then compared by means of Fault-
Tree Analysis, highlighting the contributions to the safety level of the main elements of the flight 
control system (control computers, servoactuators, antenna) and providing basic guidelines on the 
required redundancy level. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After the great success in the military sector, there is a worldwide interest in the development of 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS’s) for civil and commercial applications. Pipeline inspection, 
border control, fire fighting, agricultural management, communications relay, and cargo operations 
(i.e. any “dull, dangerous, or dirty” application) seem ideally suited for UAS’s. Nevertheless, the 
integration of UAS’s into unsegregated airspaces clearly implies critical safety issues. 
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This work provides a contribution in this context, focusing the attention on the architecture 
definition and the preliminary safety assessment of the flight control system of a light1 remotely-
piloted helicopter for civil applications. The paper is organised into three main sections: firstly, the 
reference safety objectives are defined on the basis of a survey on available certification documents; 
secondly, the most relevant functional failures are identified and analysed via Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA); finally, different system architectures are compared via Fault-Tree Analysis 
(FTA), in order to point out the key elements for the safety budget allocation. 
 
2. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION 
2.1 Survey on airworthiness certification documents 
The Article 8 of the Chicago Convention, which applies to civil aircraft, specifically refers to 
unmanned vehicles as follows, 
 
“No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot 
over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State 
and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State 
undertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open 
to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.” 
 
and it is still valid for current systems. Thus, many efforts have been (and are) made for providing 
governing standards to UAS’s. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a policy 
statement for civil airworthiness certification of UAS [1], but it does not apply to vehicles weighing 
less than 150 kgf, such as micro, mini, close-range and short-range UAS’s. For these aircraft, the 
airworthiness permission is granted by national authorities (e.g. [2, 3]), but in many countries the 
work is still in progress and many certification issues are open. 
The lack of specific safety requirements for light UAS’s would require the system engineers to 
analyse the existing standards for military applications [4-6] and the certification guidelines used 
for civil airborne systems [7-10], up to derive the safety objectives for the UAS development. In 
order to harmonize the certification methods, the EUROCAE Working Group 73 and the JARUS 
Working Group 3 have been created for developing certification guidelines for light UAS’s driven 
by the following airworthiness objective [1], 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 i.e. with maximum take-off weight from 20 to 150 kgf. 
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 “With no persons onboard the aircraft, the airworthiness objective is primarily 
targeted at the protection of people and property on the ground. A civil UAS must 
not increase the risk to people or property on the ground compared with manned 
aircraft of equivalent category […]” 
 
Actually, the safety topic for UAS’s differs from that of conventional aircraft: unlike manned 
aircraft, a UAS can be lost without danger for person. For this reason, common methods for the 
safety objective definition are based on correlating the catastrophic failure consequences (and the 
related safety requirements) to the kinetic energy of the UAS at the impact on ground, also taking 
into account the overflown population density [2, 11-16]. 
2.2 Failure classification and safety requirements 
The first step to be accomplished to assess the reliability/safety level for any airborne system is to 
define an acceptable probability of occurrence of failure conditions with catastrophic consequences. 
In Italy, the airworthiness permission for UAS weighing less than 150 kgf is granted by Ente 
Nazionale Aviazione Civile (ENAC), and a draft circular [17] has been issued in 2014 to govern the 
initial operations of light UAS’s into Italian civil airspace, and the catastrophic failure probability 
for UAS’s flying on unsegregated airspaces is there set to 10-6 fh-1. This safety level implies a 
conservative approach, since the catastrophic failure probability for light UAS’s is set to be equal to 
the one required for large UAS’s [4], disregarding overflown area population density and kinetic 
energy at ground. Nevertheless, this approach is endorsed (and used in this paper) by the authors, 
since the spread of civil UAS applications is dramatically growing, and reliability/safety concerns 
are expected to be more and more important. 
Table 1 has been thus applied to define the relationship between the probability of occurrence and 
the severity of failure conditions, and to derive the reliability/safety requirements related to 
hazardous, major and minor failures, by following the approach used by the Italian Army for the 
certification of light UAS’s flying on unsegregated airspaces [5]. 
Table 2 finally reports the allocation of software Development Assurance Level (DAL) related to 
system and parts recommended in [4], which can be also considered an important reference to 
derive similar data for civil applications. It is interesting to note that, in case of redundant systems, 
the required software DAL for system parts is one-step lower than that of a non-redundant solution. 
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      FAILURE CONSEQUENCES 
      Catastrophic  Hazardous  Major  Minor 
PROBABILITY 
OF 
OCCURRENCE 
Frequent  p ≥10‐3 fh‐1        
Probable  p ≤10‐3 fh‐1         
Occasional  p ≤10‐4 fh‐1         
Remote  p ≤10‐5 fh‐1         
Improbable  p ≤10‐6 fh‐1         
 
Table 1: Relationship between probability and severity of failure conditions. 
 
 
  FAILURE CONSEQUENCES 
  Catastrophic  Hazardous  Major  Minor 
  Single 
error 
Multiple errors  
(redundant SW) 
Single 
error 
Multiple errors 
(redundant SW) 
Single 
error 
Multiple errors 
(redundant SW) 
Single 
error 
Multiple errors 
(redundant SW) 
  Part  System  Part System Part System Part  System
DAL E             
DAL D             
DAL C             
DAL B             
DAL A             
 
Table 2 – Allocation of SW DAL related to system and parts [4]. 
 
3. RW-UAS FCS FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
3.1 UAS description 
When assessing the safety of a UAS, the analysis must be referred not only to the aerial vehicle, but 
to the whole system. In [1], the following definition is given: 
 
 “An Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) comprises individual system elements 
consisting of an unmanned aircraft, the control station and any other system 
elements necessary to enable flight, i.e. command and control link and launch and 
recovery elements […]” 
 
The basic architecture (Figure 1) of the UAS this work refers to is made of: 
S1. Air Segment (AS), composed of 
S1.1. light Rotary-Wing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (RW-UAV) 
S1.2. Electric Motor 
S1.3. Battery Pack 
S1.4. Flight Control System, equipped with 
• TX/RX system 
• Sensor system, including GPS, Sense And Avoid System (SAAS), Inertial 
Legend:  Unacceptable 
Acceptable 
Legend:  Unacceptable 
Undesirable 
Acceptable with safety assessment analysis 
Acceptable without safety assessment analysis 
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Navigation System (INS), Air-Data Sensor (ADS), Ground Sensor (GNDS) 
• four flight control servoactuators (SRV), three ones for the main rotor, one 
for the tail rotor 
• Flight Control Computer (FCC), which elaborates the commands coming 
from the GCS and the signals provided by the FCS sensors, implements the 
RW-UAS flight control laws, and generates the SRV demands 
S2. Ground Segment (GS), i.e. the Ground Control Station (GCS) 
S3. Communication Link (CL) between Ground Segment and Air Segment 
 
Ground
Sensor 
Air‐Data
Sensors 
Inertial 
Navigation System 
          TX          RX
    
     Antenna 
 
RX 
 
TX 
  
  
Rotary‐wing UAV
SAAS 
 
Figure 1 : Basic architecture of the UAS. 
3.2 RW-UAS FCS Functional Hazard Analysis 
The safety assessment of the RW-UAS FCS has started from the development of the FHA tables, 
which have been referred to the following main RW-UAS functions2 (note that the code used for the 
function classification is coherent to the UAS architecture breakdown given at section 3.1): 
                                                 
2 In automatic modes, the RW-UAS flight controls are driven by the FCC, and the GCS pilot provides reference signals 
via the inceptors. In autonomous modes, the RW-UAS is capable of implementing missions without receiving 
commands by the GCS (e.g. way-point navigation). 
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Servo UAV 
 
ALT/VS 
sensing 
S1.4.f1. Capability to provide means for the GCS pilot to control the UAS via automatic modes 
S1.4.f2. Capability to provide means for the GCS pilot to control the UAS via autonomous modes 
S1.4.f3. Capability to provide means for the GCS pilot to monitor the UAS FCS health state 
Figure 2 reports an example of RW-UAS FCS operation, in which the RW-UAS is controlled via 
autopilot vertical motion mode, based on two nested closed-loop controls: the inner one is a Vertical 
Speed Hold (VSH), the outer one is an Altitude Hold (ALTH). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: RW-UAS FCS working scheme (VSH/ALTH automatic mode). 
Following the guidelines provided in [7, 8], the FHA has been performed by compiling tables in 
which, for each FCS function, three possible situations are analysed [18]: 
1. Total loss of function 
2. Partial loss of function 
3. Misleading and/or malfunction without warning 
For each type of failure condition, the possible failure causes are identified and (also taking into 
account the flight phase in which the failure occurs) the effects are evaluated in qualitative terms, 
providing, if applicable, remarks or indications about mitigating actions. 
Each failure condition is identified by a reference code where 
¾ the first three digits represent the examined system, e.g. “S1.4” stands for “system 4 (FCS) 
of the UAS section 1 (Air Segment)”; 
¾ the successive three digits refer to the examined functional failure condition, e.g. “f2.2” 
stands for “failure condition 2 (partial loss) of the function 2 (autonomous mode control)”; 
¾ the final letter refers to the examined flight phase, e.g. “a” stands for “flight”. 
An example of FHA result is given in Table 3. It refers to a failure condition potentially causing 
catastrophic consequences, i.e. the total loss of the automatic control mode during flight.
Tx/Rx 
system  SRV 
system 
RW‐
UAV 
ALTH  loop  VSH  loop 
Mode switch
GCS 
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Ref.  UAS function  Phase  Failure Condition  Failure Effect  Classification  Remarks / Mitigating Actions 
S1.4.f1.1a  Provide means 
for the GCS pilot 
to control the 
RW‐UAS via 
automatic modes 
Flight  Total loss of the FCS capability to 
control the RW‐UAS via automatic 
modes, which can be related to 
 
- total loss of FCS capability to 
actuate commands 
- total loss of FCS capability to 
sense the state for the 
automatic mode control 
- total loss of the FCS capability 
to acquire/compute/generate 
signals 
- total loss of the FCS capability 
to communicate with the GCS 
‐ Main rotor 
swash plate does 
not move 
properly 
‐ Tail rotor does 
not move 
properly 
‐ The FCS is 
unable to control 
the main rotor 
thrust 
‐ The FCS is 
unable to control 
the tail rotor 
thrust 
Catastrophic  The failure is 
unrecoverable and 
the RW‐UAS 
impacts to the 
ground. 
The effects of the 
impact on ground 
can be mitigated by 
the use of a passive 
Flight Termination 
System (e.g. 
parachute) 
 
Table 3 – UAS FHA table referred to the failure condition S1.4.f1.1a 
 
Loss of UAS
Total loss of 
GCS
Total loss of 
Data Link
Total loss of 
AS
Total loss of 
Battery pack 
Total loss of FCS 
automatic mode 
Structural/mechanical  
RW‐UAV failure
Total loss of  
SRV system 
Total loss of  
FCC 
Total loss of  
automatic mode 
sensors 
Total loss of  
TX/RX system 
Total loss of 
Engine 
ADS 
failure
INS 
failure
SRV1 
failure
SRV2 
failure
SRV3 
failure
SRV4 
failure
 
Figure 3 – UAS FTA related to catastrophic failures. 
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As pointed out in Table 3, the FHA allowed to identify four possible causes bringing to the 
S1.4.f1.1a failure condition, related to following failures: 
i. total loss of capability to actuate the flight control commands (caused by the SRV system) 
ii. total loss of capability to sense the state (caused by the Sensor system) 
iii. total loss of capability to implement control computing functions (caused by the FCC) 
iv. total loss of capability to communicate with the GCS (caused by the TX/RX system) 
The failure condition S1.4.f1.1a is clearly one of the possible situations for the UAS in which 
catastrophic consequences occur, as shown in the simplified UAS FTA in Figure 3. 
 
4. COMPARISON OF FCS ARCHITECTURES VIA FAULT-TREE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Single-simplex FCS architecture 
The first FCS architecture does not contain any redundant element (Figure 4). This solution, though 
expected to be inadequate to achieve satisfactory safety targets, can be useful to evaluate the 
relative impacts of the FCS subsystems on the overall reliability/safety budget. 
 
 
Ground 
Sensor 
Air‐Data 
Sensors 
Inertial 
Navigation System 
  
           TX           RX 
    
     Antenna 
 
RX 
 
TX 
  
  
 Rotary‐wing UAV 
 SAAS 
                
 
from 
Sensors and Antenna 
to 
Servoactuators 
Electrical Power Supply
Power 
Supply Unit
 
Figure 4 – Single-simplex FCS: internal layout of the FCC. 
The FTA related to the failure condition S1.4.f1.1a for the RW-UAS FCS with single-simplex 
architecture is reported in Figure 5, with the evaluation of the parts failure rates per flight hour 
obtained by applying the data and models provided by [19, 20, 21]. 
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1.612e‐7  1.06e‐8  1.06e‐8 
3.598e‐51.824e‐7 
7.79e‐8 3.145e‐5  1.531e‐7 4.280e‐6 1.56e‐8 1.06e‐8
3.596e‐5 
2.62e‐8
3.616e‐5 
9.098e‐5  9.098e‐5
1.820e‐4 
Total loss of FCC
CPU
failure
I/O
failure
Supply 
unit
failure
Input 
channel 
failure 
Output 
channel 
failure 
1.420e‐5 1.261e‐6
1.546e‐51.430e‐6  1.399e‐5
3.088e‐5
1.446e‐4  8.086e‐6
3.656e‐4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Single-simplex RW-UAS FCS: FTA related to the failure condition S1.4.f1.1a. 
 
4.2 Dual-duplex FCS architecture 
A more reliable RW-UAS FCS architecture can be obtained by using a dual-duplex FCC. As shown 
in Figure 6, the FCC unit is dual, i.e. it is composed of two computers working in active-active 
mode (FCC1 and FCC2). Each of the two computers is then duplex, i.e. it is made of two 
computing sections (CPU and I/O Card), used for command and monitoring functions respectively. 
The two CPUs of each computer are capable of exchanging data by means of a Cross-Lane Data 
Link (CLDL), in order to implement health-monitoring algorithms. 
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 Electrical Power Supply 1
Power 
Supply 
Unit 1 
Power 
Supply 
Unit 2 
Electrical Power Supply 2FCC 
FCC1  FCC2
I/O Card 1A 
 
(Command) 
I/O Card 1B 
 
(Monitor) 
I/O Card 2A
 
(Command) 
I/O Card 2B 
 
(Monitor) 
CPU 1A 
 
(Command)
CPU 1B 
 
(Monitor) 
CLDL 1  CLDL 2 
CPU 2A 
 
(Command)
CPU 2B 
 
(Monitor) 
from 
Sensors 
and Antenna 
to 
Servoactuators
 
Figure 6 – Dual-duplex FCS: internal layout of the FCC. 
As a result of the dual architectural solution, the servoactuators need to be redundant. Since it is 
expected that the integration of multiple actuators in a light RW-UAS could be unfeasible, 
intrinsically-redundant SRV are necessary (i.e. the electric motor is equipped with two coils 
working in active-active mode). 
The FTA related to the failure condition S1.4.f1.1a for the RW-UAS FCS with dual-duplex 
architecture is reported in Figure 7, with the evaluation of the parts failure rates per flight hour 
obtained by applying the data and models provided by [19, 20, 21]. 
 
4.3 Summary of results 
The safety analysis results point out that the single-simplex FCS is definitely inadequate for the 
required safety target (<10-6 fh-1). It is worth noting that, in this case, the subsystems mainly driving 
the safety budget are: 
• the FCC, having a failure rate of 3.088 10-5 fh-1 
• the SRV system, having a failure rate of 1.446 10-4 fh-1 
• the TX/RX system, having a failure rate of 1.82 10-4 fh-1 
In particular, the total failure probability of the single-simplex case (3.656 10-4 fh-1) is roughly 
given by 39% from the SRV system, by 50% from the TX/RX system, and by the rest by the FCC. 
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Total loss of FCC
FCC 1
failure
FCC 2
failure
CLDL 
failure
Command 
CPU 
failure
Monitor 
CPU 
failure
CPU
failure
I/O
failure
Supply 
unit
failure
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I/O
failure
Monitor 
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1.546e‐5 1.430e‐6 
1.399e‐5
2.31e‐9
3.092e‐5 
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SRV failure
Mechanical 
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failure
Motor
failure
Motor 
electrical 
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Motor 
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failure
Line 1 
electrical 
failure
Line 2 
electrical 
failure
Control 
electronics 
failure
Position 
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Gear box 
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External 
bearing 1 
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bearing 2 
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Shaft 
failure
Internal 
bearing 
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1.612e‐7  1.06e‐8  1.06e‐8 
1.824e‐7 
7.79e‐8  3.145e‐5  1.531e‐7  4.280e‐6
3.596e‐5 
1.293e‐9 
1.56e‐8 1.06e‐8
2.62e‐8
2.749e‐8
2.099e‐7 
9.098e‐5 9.098e‐5 
1.820e‐4
3.310e‐8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Dual-duplex FCS for RW-UAS: FTA related to the failure condition S1.4.f1.1a. 
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On the other hand, the dual-duplex FCS is expected to be compliant, but the margin between the 
FTA predictions and the required safety target is quite small (especially if one considers that other 
catastrophic failure conditions not involving the FCS must be taken into account, Figure 3). 
Moreover, since for the dual-duplex FCS the safety budget is essentially dominated by the 
servoactuators, the design of these elements must be followed with great care. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The work points out that, for the development of a UAS with light RW-UAS, the key safety 
elements are the flight control computers, the servoactuators for the flight controls and the TX/RX 
system. The number of computers (single or dual), the type of signal processing they implement 
(simplex or duplex), as well as the servoactuator technological solution demonstrate to have a 
dramatic impact on safety, and they must be regarded as crucial aspects in the development of this 
type of UAS. In particular, with reference to a critical failure condition (the total loss of RW-UAS 
automatic mode control), a single-simplex FCS is not capable of satisfying the safety requirement 
(<10-6 fh-1). The single-simplex FCS failure probability roughly depends for the 50% on the TX/RX 
system, for 39% on the servo system, and for the rest on the FCC. The use of a dual-duplex FCS 
brings the safety level to be compliant, but the margin between the predictions and the requirement 
is quite small. In this perspective, it is important to outline that the safety budget for the dual-duplex 
FCS is essentially driven by the servoactuators, so the safety enhancement for this type of UAS 
must start from dedicating a great care to the design of these components. 
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